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Sides v. Duke Hospital: A Public Policy Exception to the
Employment-At-Will Rule
North Carolina adheres to the common-law rule that employment for an
indefinite period is terminable at the will of either party.1 The employment-at-.
will rule allows an employer to discharge an employee "for good cause or for no
cause, or even for bad cause.' 2 Although the at-will rule remains firmly estab-
lished in modem law, it has been limited by labor laws3 and other federal and
state laws.4 In addition, since 1973, numerous courts have either recognized a
public policy exception to the rule or have indicated they would do so under
appropriate facts.5
1. The at-will rule first appeared in an 1877 treatise on the law of master and servant. H.
WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877). "iT]he rule [in
America] is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the
servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof." It is
generally agreed, however, that Wood's rule was not supported by the cited cases. See Brockmeyer
v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 567 n.3, 335 N.W.2d 834, 837 n.3 (1983); Feinman, The
Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 126 (1976). Neverthe-
less, the at-will rule was compatible with existing notions of laissez-faire economics, Note, Employ-
ment at Will: An Analysis and Critique of the Judicial Role, 68 IowA L. REv. 787, 789 (1983), and
freedom of contract, Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1816, 1818-19, 1824-26 (1980).
The at-will rule in North Carolina was stated in Edwards v. Seaboard & Roanoke R.L, 121
N.C. 489, 28 S.E. 137 (1897), and has been reaffirmed by numerous cases. See, e.g., Smith v. Ford
Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976); Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971);
Smith v. Monsanto Co., 71 N.C. App. 632, 322 S.E.2d 611 (1984); Brooks v. Carolina Tel. & Tel.
Co., 56 N.C. App. 801, 290 S.E.2d 370 (1982).
2. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884) (upholding employer's right to
discharge at will), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134
(1915).
3. E.g., Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (4) (1982) (prohibits
discharge based on union activity); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-81 (1981) (prohibits discharge based on
membership in labor union).
4. E.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (prohibits discharge of employees
because their wages have been garnished); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. § 623 (1982) (prohibits discharge based on employee's age); Occupational Safety and Health
Act, id. §§ 651-660 (prohibits discharge for reporting safety violations); Vocational Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, id. §§ 793, 794 (prohibits discharge of handicapped employee from any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance); Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, id.
§§ 1140, 1141 (prohibits discharge of employee to prevent collection of vested pension rights); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1982) (prohibits discharge for instituting or causing proceedings or
testifying against employer for violations); Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (1982) (prohibits discharge based on race, color, sex, national origin, or religion); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-6.1 (1979) (prohibits discharge for filing claim for workers' compensation).
5. The states that have either adopted or expressed a willingness to adopt a public policy
exception to the at-will rule include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Note, Employment at Will, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 457,
461-62 n.25 (1985); see infra notes 61-79 and accompanying text. See generally DeGiuseppe, The
Effect of the Employment-at-Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10
FoRDHAM URn. L.J 1 (1981) (survey of jurisdictions recognizing public policy exception); Kraus-
kopf, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Modern At Will Rule, 51 UMKC L. REv.
189 (1983) (survey and analysis of case law modifying at-will rule); Note, Public Policy Limitations to
the Employment At-Will Doctrine Since Geary v. United States Steel Corporation, 44 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 1115 (1983) (review of case law and proposed legislation highlighting erosion of at-will rule).
The modification of the at-will rule has been described as "[perhaps the most significant new
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Many courts, however, including until recently those in North Carolina, 6
have refused to impose any public policy limitations on the at-will rule.7 Most
of these courts have stated that any changes in the at-will rule should be made
by the legislature.8 Courts have also been reluctant to interfere with the inher-
ent freedom of contract between an employer and an employee9 and have rea-
soned that bad motives alone cannot make unlawful an otherwise lawful act.10
Finally, some courts have declined to adopt a public policy exception because it
is "too nebulous a standard." 1' 1
In the recent case of Sides v. Duke Hospital,2 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals departed from its previous decisions and announced that an employer's
right to discharge an employee was limited by public policy concerns. This Note
examines the development and current status of exceptions to the at-will rule
and analyzes the public policy exception adopted in Sides. It concludes that the
decision in Sides offers employees in North Carolina significantly greater protec-
tion against unjust and arbitrary discharge without unduly restricting an em-
ployer's discretion to discharge an employee.
Marie Sides was employed as a nurse anesthetist at Duke University Medi-
cal Center (DUMC), a hospital operated by Duke University (Duke), for more
than eleven years prior to her dismissal.13 While on duty Sides refused to follow
a doctor's order to administer anesthetics to a patient because she thought the
legal development affecting employment relations during the past decade and a half, and almost
surely the most significant such common law development." Report of the Committee on Develop-
ment of the Law of Individual Rights and Responsibilities in the Work Place, 1982 A.B.A. SEc.
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT L. 1, 16.
6. States that have refused to recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge are concen-
trated in the South. "It is as though the turn of the century values concerning formalism, laissez-
faire economics, stare decisis and deference to legislatures... still predominate in the South."
Krauskopf, supra note 5, at 251. These states are Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, Tennes-
see, and South Carolina. Florida and Kentucky have indicated a willingness to adopt a public policy
exception. Id. Texas recently recognized an exception to the at-will rule in Hauck v. Sabine Pilots,
Inc., 672 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd, 687 S.W.2d 733 (rex. 1985) (employee discharged
for refusing to pump boat bilges in illegal manner).
7. See, eg., Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977) (employee ordered to
falsify medical records); Troy v. Interfinancial, Inc., 171 Ga. App. 763, 320 S.E.2d 872 (1984) (em-
ployee refused to give false testimony in deposition during lawsuit against employer); Martin v.
Platt, 179 Ind. App. 688, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (1979) (employees reported "kickback" payments); Kelly
v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981) (employee filed workers' compensation
claim); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232
(1983) (employee alleged he was fired for disclosing accounting improprieties and because of his
age); Maus v. National Living Centers, 633 S.W.2d 674 (rex. Ct. App. 1982) (nurse's aid reported
patients receiving poor care and being neglected); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581 (1979)
(dispute over vacation time and sick leave).
8. See, eg., Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, cert. denied,
295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978); Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind. App. 688, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (1979);
Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981); Murphy v. American Home Prods.
Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
9. See, eg., Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977); Kelly v. Mississippi
Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981).
10. See, eg., Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981); Jones v. Keogh,
137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581 (1979).
11. Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977).
12. 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818, cert. denied, 312 N.C. 331, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985).
13. Id. at 332, 328 S.E.2d at 820.
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drugs would harm the patient. 14 The doctor nevertheless administered the
drugs, and the patient suffered permanent brain damage.15 The patient's estate
filed suit, alleging that the patient had been injured as a result of the doctor's
negligence. 1
6
Before Sides gave her deposition in the case, she was advised by several
doctors at DUMC and by attorneys for Duke not to testify about all she had
observed, and some of the doctors warned her that she "would be in trouble" if
she did so. 17 Despite these warnings, Sides "testified fully and truthfully" at the
deposition and again at the trial.18 After the trial court entered judgment for the
patient's estate in the amount of $1,750,000, several doctors displayed hostility
toward Sides and refused to work with her. 19 Shortly thereafter, Sides was noti-
fied that her job performance was poor and that she would be monitored closely
for the next three months.20 Although Sides requested specific examples of her
poor performance, none was given, 2 1 and she was discharged less than three
weeks later.22
Sides brought an action against Duke for wrongful discharge and for
wrongful interference with her employment contract.23 The trial court dis-
missed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.24 In a unanimous decision,25 the court of appeals reversed the dismis-
sal of the claim against DUMC and determined that Sides had stated claims for
relief under both tort and contract theories.26
The court began its analysis by considering whether its earlier decision in
Dockery v. Lampert Table Company 27 controlled Sides' tort claim for wrongful
14. Id. at 333, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
15. Id.
16. Id; see Fields v. Duke Univ., No. 80CVS1946 (Cumberland County Super. Ct. 1980).
Fields was the administratrix of the patient's estate. The patient had been operated on at DUMC for
a cleft palate and went into cardiac arrest when anesthetics were administered. The jury returned a
verdict of $1,750,000 in favor of the patient's estate. Id.; see Record at 3-4, Sides.
17. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 333, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 333-34, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
20. Id. at 334, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 334, 328 S.E.2d at 821-22.
23. Id. at 334-35, 328 S.E.2d at 822.
24. Id. at 332, 328 S.E.2d at 819.
25. Judge Arnold wrote a brief concurring opinion, stating that although he did not agree with
the majority's reasoning concerning the wrongful discharge tort, he would not delay the decision any
longer by writing an in-depth opinion. Id. at 349-50, 328 S.E.2d at 830-31 (Arnold, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 343-45, 328 S.E.2d 826-28. The court reversed the dismissal of the wrongful dis-
charge and breach of contract claims against Duke Hospital, but affirmed the order dismissing those
claims against the chief nurse and two doctors. Id. The court also reversed the interference with
contract claim against the two doctors. Id. at 348, 328 S.E.2d at 830. This cause of action is recog-
nized in North Carolina and will not be discussed in this Note. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289
N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976); Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954); Fitzgerald
v. Wolf, 40 N.C. App. 197, 252 S.E.2d 523 (1979).
27. 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978), See
generally Note, Workmen's Compensation, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 139 (1979) (no private right of
action for retaliatory discharge in North Carolina); Note, Worker's Compensation, 58 N.C.L. REV.
629 (1980) (legislative response to Dockery).
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discharge. In Dockery defendant had discharged plaintiff because plaintiff had
pursued his worker's compensation benefits.2 8 Plaintiff alleged that his dis-
charge was wrongful as against public policy. The court of appeals refused to
recognize plaintiff's claim, rejecting the reasoning of the Indiana Supreme Court,
which had recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge under a fact situ-
ation similar to Dockery.29 In Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Company,30 the
Indiana court held that retaliatory discharge was a "device" proscribed by the
State workers' compensation statute.3 1 Although the Indiana statute did not
provide for a private right of action, the court in Frampton created such a right
"in order for the goals of the act to be realized and for public policy to be
effectuated." '3 2
Although the North Carolina workers' compensation statute was similar to
Indiana's, 3 3 the court of appeals failed to discuss the public policy principles
underlying Frampton. The Frampton court pointed out that the workers' com-
pensation statute gave employees a right to be compensated for work-related
injuries and imposed a corresponding duty on employers.3 4 The court reasoned
that allowing employers to discharge employees for filing workers' compensation
claims would discourage employees from exercising their rights to receive com-
pensation and would relieve employers of their duty to compensate.3 5 The
Dockery court stated only that policy concerns were best left to the general as-
sembly, concluding that a judicial remedy "would do violence to the long-stand-
ing rule governing employment contracts for an indefinite period and would
constitute judicial legislation." 36 Moreover, the court interpreted the general
assembly's failure to create a cause of action as evidence of its intent that none
be created.37 The Dockery court noted that the analogy drawn by the court in
Frampton between retaliatory discharge and retaliatory eviction was not applica-
ble to North Carolina because its courts had expressly rejected the defense of
retaliatory eviction.
In Sides, however, the court of appeals suggested that it may not have inter-
preted legislative intent correctly in Dockery.3 8 The court noted that in response
to Dockery the general assembly had created a cause of action for employees
demoted or discharged for instituting workers' compensation proceedings.
39
Furthermore, at the same session, the general assembly had authorized the de-
28. Dockery, 36 N.C. App. at 293, 244 S.E.2d at 272.
29. See Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
30. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
31. Id. at 252, 297 N.E.2d at 428.
32. Id. at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 427.
33. Dockery, 36 N.C. App. at 295-96, 244 S.E.2d at 274. The North Carolina workers' com-
pensation statute states that "[no. .. device shall ... relieve an employer.., of any obligation
created by this Article." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6 (1985).
34. 260 Ind. at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 427.
35. Id.
36. Dockery, 36 N.C. App. at 300, 244 S.E.2d at 277. Other courts also have deferred to the
legislature rather than create a public policy exception. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
37. Dockery, 36 N.C. App. at 300, 244 S.E.2d at 277.
38. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 337, 328 S.E.2d at 823.
39. North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 738, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 806 (codified
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fense of retaliatory eviction.4 ° The court reasoned that these actions showed
"that the legislature is not at all adverse to the courts of this State entertaining
actions based on a violation of policies that have been enacted or otherwise es-
tablished for the protection and benefit of the public."'4 1
The court further dispelled the notion that Dockery controlled its decision,
noting that Sides was distinguishable from Dockery because it presented much
more compelling public policy considerations. 42 The court recognized the pub-
lic interest in protecting employees who are entitled to workers' compensation
benefits from retaliatory discharge, but stated that the public has a greater inter-
est in preventing the obstruction ofjustice.4 3 After noting that pejury, suborna-
tion of pejury, and intimidation of witnesses were offenses at common law and
are punishable under North Carolina statutes, the court said: "These offenses
are. . . an affront to the integrity of our judicial system, an impediment to the
constitutional mandate of the courts to administer justice fairly, and a violation
of the right that all litigants in this State have to have their cases tried upon
honest evidence fully given." 44 The court concluded that to deny Sides a cause
of action "would be a grave disservice to the public."4 5
The court observed that the at-will rule has been critized by numerous com-
mentators in recent years46 and cited cases from other jurisdictions concerning
the wrongful discharge issue.47 The cases the court cited pointed to an evident,
if somewhat erratic, trend toward formulating a public policy exception to the
at-will rule. Public policy, however, is a broad concept48 and therefore some
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1985)). An employee who is discharged for filing a workers' compen-
sation claim may bring a civil action against the employer and also is entitled to be reinstated. Id.
40. North Carolina Retaliatory Eviction Act, ch. 807, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 960 (codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-37.1 (1984)).
41. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 337, 328 S.E.2d at 823.
42. Thus, instead of overruling Dockery, the court found it did not control. After stating that
Sides was not a departure from common law and clear precedent, the court explained that North
Carolina courts do not overrule decisions lightly, quoting from a North Carolina Supreme Court
opinion: "No court has been more faithful to stare decisis [than the supreme court]. . . . Neverthe-
less, when the duty has seemed clear, it has [departed from precedent]. . . . 'The doctrine of stare
decisis will not be applied in any event to preserve and perpetuate error and grievous wrong.'" Id. at
343-44, 328 S.E.2d at 827 (quoting State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 767, 51 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1949)).
43. Id. at 337, 328 S.E.2d at 823.
44. Id. at 338, 328 S.E.2d at 823-24.
45. Id. at 338, 328 S.E.2d at 824.
46. Numerous commentators have written on the at-will rule. For criticism of the at-will rule,
see Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Em-
ployer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1404 (1967); Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Nec-
essary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust
Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. Rav. 481 (1976); Note, Protecting Employees At Will
Against Wrongful Discharge" The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983). Recent
support for the at-will rule may be found in Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CH. L.
REv. 947 (1984).
47. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 339-42, 328 S.E.2d at 825-26. The court cited cases from fourteen
jurisdictions, including Parnor v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982);
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Nees v. Hocks, 272
Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978).
48. "The term 'public policy' is perhaps the most expansive and widely comprehensive phrase
known to the law." 72 C.J.S. Policy 209 (1951).
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courts have refused to recognize it as an exception to the at-will rule.4 9 Even the
California Court of Appeals, in Petermann v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,50 the first case to uphold the exception, admitted that the term is
"not subject to precise definition."5 1 Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court, in
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.,52 described the definition of public pol-
icy as "the Achilles heel" of the wrongful discharge tort.5 3
Courts have defined public policy in various ways. For example, in
Petermann the couft stated that public policy is the "'principle of law which
holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to
the public or against the public good.' ,,54 In Palmateer the court stated that
public policy concerns "strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and
responsibilities. 55 Other courts have alluded simply to "some substantial pub-
lic policy principle"5 6 or "a clear mandate of public policy." 57
Thus, courts do not concur on what constitutes public policy.58 Moreover,
they also disagree on the sources they are willing to use in applying the excep-
tion to the employment-at-will rule.59 Although statutes, constitutional provi-
sions, regulations, professional codes of ethics, and judicial decisions have all
been mentioned as sources of public policy,60 most of the courts that have
adopted a public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule have required
that the discharge contravene a specific statutory or constitutional provision.
The exception has been applied when an employee has been discharged in viola-
tion of a statute that applies to the employment context, as when employees have
been discharged for pursuing their workers' compensation rights6t or for refus-
ing to take a polygraph test required by the employer.62
Courts have also applied the public policy exception when an employee has
been discharged for refusing to commit an unlawful act or to violate a statutory
49. See, eg., Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977) (public policy is
"too nebulous a standard"); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974)
(difficult to prove that discharge is contrary to public policy because discharge violates no clear
mandate of public policy).
50. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); see infra text accompanying notes 63-64.
51. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d at 27 (quoting Safeway Stores v. Retail
Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 567, 575, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (1953)).
52. 85 hi. 2d. 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); see infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
53. Palmateer, 85 nl. 2d at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
54. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27 (quoting Safeway Stores v. Retail
Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 567, 575, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (1953)).
55. Palmateer, 85 i. 2d at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79.
56. See, eg., Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 124, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (1978).
57. See, ag., Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 380, 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982).
58. "The phrase [public policy] is used in several senses, and it may mean the common law or
general statutory law of the state, and it may mean the prevalent notions of justice and general
fundamental conceptions of right and wrong, and it may mean both." 72 C.J.S. Policy 209 (1951).
59. See infra notes 61-79 and accompanying text.
60. Id.
61. E.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IMI. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Frampton, 260 Ind.
249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973). Contra Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss.
1981); Dockery, 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272.
62. See, eg., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (Pennsylvania
statute forbidding polygraph test as condition of employment evinces State public policy).
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duty. Petermann,6 3 in which an employee was discharged when he refused to
commit perjury before a legislative committee investigating union wrongdoing,
is the leading case. The court stated, "It would be obnoxious to the interests of
the state and contrary to public policy and sound morality to allow an employer
to discharge any employee on the ground that the employee declined to
commit perjury, an act specifically enjoined by statute." 64 Other courts have
extended protection to an employee discharged for serving on a jury,65 for refus-
ing to perform catheterizations for which the employee was not licensed, 66 or for
refusing to participate in an illegal price fixing scheme.67
"Whistleblowing" 68 also comes under the public policy exception, and
courts have recognized a cause of action when an employee has been discharged
for insisting that an employer comply with laws related to consumer credit and
protection, 69 food packaging,70 and the registration of pharmacists. 7 1
"Whistleblower" protection, however, was not extended to an employee who
made "a nuisance of himself" in questioning the safety of his employer's prod-
uct 72 or to a physician who opposed the development of a controversial drug
because of "a difference in medical opinions."'73
Even when a statutory right exists, courts have not allowed actions when
the policy claimed to be violated is more private than public.74 In addition,
when a statute provides a remedy for a discharged employee, most courts have
not applied the public policy exception, reasoning that the legislature has created
an appropriate remedy.75
63. 174 Cal. App. at 184, 344 P.2d at 25.
64. Id. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
65. See Ness v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); cf. Reuther v. Fowler & Williams,
Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978) (failing to inform an employer of absence due to jury
duty may be grounds for dismissal).
66. See O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 NJ. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978).
67. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980).
68. Whistleblowing occurs when an employee reports employer violations of statutory policy.
For a discussion of whistleblowing, see Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee
Who "Blows the histle'" .4 Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of Public Policy, 1977 Wis.
L. REv. 777.
69. See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978).
70. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).
71. See Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728 (1982).
72. See Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
73. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
74. See, eg., Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F. Supp. 242, 244 (N.D. I1. 1983)
(discharge for retaining attorney in wage dispute with employer would create "the monster that
swallowed the employment-at-will rule"); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App.
1977) (discharge for attending law school at night); Campbell v. Ford Indus., Inc., 274 Or. 243, 546
P.2d 141 (1976) (discharge for exercising stockholder's right to inspect corporate books),
75. See, eg., Bonham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977) (Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act provides remedy); McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 489 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wis.
1980) (Fair Employment Act and Employment Peace Act provide remedies). A few courts have
recognized a common-law cause of action in addition to a statutorily created cause of action. E.g.,
Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982) (right existed before new
statutory remedy created); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (1980) (legisla-




A minority of courts have adopted a broader version of the public policy
exception by not restricting it to statutory sources. In Palmateer76 an action
was allowed when an employee had informed a law enforcement agency that a
coemployee might be violating the criminal code.77 The Illinois Supreme Court
stated that although "[n]o specific constitutional or statutory provision requires
a citizen to take an active part in the ferreting out and prosecution of crime,...
public policy. . . favors citizen crime-fighters."'78 In addition, one court has
suggested that under appropriate conditions public policy may be found in pro-
fessional codes of ethics.79
Courts that have adopted the broad public policy exception emphasize that
restraint is necessary "lest they mistake their own predelictions [sic] for public
policy which deserves recognition at law." 80 Consequently, these courts have
applied the broad public policy exception only in very narrow circumstances, as
when an employee reported a crime to public officials. 8 ' There is no indication
that courts will apply the public policy exception, absent a statutory basis, in an
indiscriminate manner. Moreover, even if public policy is an "'amorphous'
[concept] . . . , the narrowing of it totally defeats its effectiveness. . . Ulti-
mately, it is the broader approach that affords protection to the more nebulous
societal values that are not, and may never be, spelled out in a specific amend-
ment or statutory provision."
8 2
With the Sides decision, North Carolina joins the growing number of states
that have adopted the public policy exception to the at-will rule.83 In adopting
the exception, the court of appeals relied on statutes prohibiting perjury, subor-
nation of perjury, and intimidation of witnesses.84 Thus, Sides falls within the
narrow view of the public policy exception, which requires that public policy be
legislatively declared.
It is unclear, however, whether the court would allow a cause of action
when there is an existing statutory remedy, such as that provided in the workers'
compensation statute. The court cited several cases in which courts have recog-
76. 85 Ill. 2d at 124, 421 N.E.2d at 876.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
79. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 NJ. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980). How-
ever, "a code of ethics designed to serve only the interests of a profession or an administrative
regulation concerned with technical matters probably would not be sufficient." Id. One commenta-
tor fears that a nonstatutory approach to public policy would result in a flood of litigation and would
render employers and employees uncertain about the status of their relationship. Note, Pierce v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.: Is the Public Policy Exception to the At Vill Doctrine a Bad Omen for
the Employment Relationship?, 33 RtrrGEas L. REv. 1187, 1197 (1981). Furthermore, small em-
ployers would be most vulnerable to the burdens of litigation and thus would be forced to retain
unsatisfactory employees or to keep extensive records that would interfere with informal employ-
ment relationships. Id. at 1196.
80. Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 297, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 163 (1982).
81. See Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 124, 421 N.E.2d at 876.
82. Comment, Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet: The Narrow Public Policy Exception to the
Terminable-At-Will Rule, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 565, 587 (1984).
83. See supra note 5.
84. Perjury and subornation of peijury are felonies punishable by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-209,
-210 (1981); intimidation of witnesses is a misdemeanor punishable by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-226
(1981).
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nized a cause of action when an employee was discharged for asserting workers'
compensation rights,85 but noted that "not all of the compensation laws in-
volved in these cases specifically provide a remedy, as North Carolina now
does."' 86 Given this language it is unlikely that the court of appeals would pro-
vide additional relief to a plaintiff when the general assembly has provided a
specific remedy.
It is also unclear whether the court intended to limit the public policy ex-
ception to statutory expressions of policy. Several cases the court cited take a
broad approach to the public policy exception and allow policy to be discerned
from judicial decisions. 87 Although the Sides court did not discuss these cases,
it did note that other courts' discussions of the at-will rule had not focused on
"the fundamental fact upon which the at will doctrine rests." 88 The court
explained:
We refer to the obvious and indisputable fact that in a civilized state
where reciprocal legal rights and duties abound the words "at will"
can never mean "without limit or qualification," . . . for in such a
state the rights of each person are necessarily and inherently limited by
the rights of others and the interests of the public. An at will preroga-
tive without limits could be suffered only in an anarchy, and there not
for long-it certainly cannot be suffered in a society such as ours with-
out weakening the bond of counter-balancing rights and obligations
that holds such societies together.89
This statement suggests that the court intended to define the public policy excep-
tion broadly.
Broad definitions of public policy, however, do not necessarily indicate a
broad view of the sources of such policy. In Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,90
the Wisconsin Supreme Court defined public policy as "community common
sense and common conscience," but limited the public policy exception to con-
stitutional and statutory expressions.91 Unfortunately, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals never explicitly identified the sources on which public policy
could be based. The court's reference, however, to "policies that have been en-
acted or otherwise established for the protection and benefit of the public" 92 sug-
gests that the court may be willing, under appropriate circumstances, to
consider nonstatutory sources of public policy.
85. See Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 341, 328 S.E.2d at 826 (citing Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 111.
2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425(1973); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dept. of Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630
P.2d 186 (1981); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Lally v.
Copygraphics, 85 NJ. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981); Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1976)).
86. Id; see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
87. Palmateer, 85 IMl. 2d at 130-32, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79; see supra notes 76-79 and accompa-
nying text.
88. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826.
89. Id.
90. 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
91. Id. at 573, 335 N.W.2d at 840.
92. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 337, 328 S.E.2d at 823 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 64
EMPLOYMENT-AT- WILL
After holding that Sides had stated a claim in tort for wrongful discharge,
the court considered whether she had stated a claim for breach of contract.93
Finding that the same public policy concerns that applied in the tort action ap-
plied in the contract action, the court held that Duke had no right to terminate
the employment contract.94 Moreover, the court recognized that Sides had
given independent consideration for the employment contract, apart from serv-
ices, thus removing the contract from the at-will rule.95 Thus, a breach of con-
tract had occurred because the discharge had not been for unsatisfactory
performance. 9 6
The Sides court did not consider the possibility of implying a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts as a basis for recovery. A
few courts, borrowing from the Uniform Commercial Code's requirement of
good faith in commercial contracts, 97 have implied an obligation of good faith
and fair dealing in employment contracts. The most frequently cited case using
this theory is Monge v. Beebe Rubber Company,98 in which the New Hampshire
Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff who had been sexually harassed to recover for
wrongful discharge. 99 The court held that a discharge made in bad faith was
contrary to the public interest and constituted a breach of contract even though
the employment was at will.10"
The application of a covenant of good faith to employment contracts, how-
ever, is not widely accepted. Even in New Hampshire, subsequent court deci-
sions narrowly construed Monge to apply only to violations of specific public
policies.10 1 A duty to terminate in good faith has been criticized as unduly re-
93. Id. at 344, 328 S.E.2d at 828.
94. Id. at 344-45, 328 S.E.2d at 828. Most wrongful discharge actions based on the public
policy exception are tort actions, although some have been contract actions. See, eg., Petennann,
174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
New Jersey recognizes that such actions may be in tort or contract. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). In addition to damage awards for back pay, tort actions
may also result in punitive damages. In Sides, the court awarded punitive damages for both wrong-
ful discharge and interference with contract. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 349, 328 S.E.2d at 830.
95. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 345, 328 S.E.2d at 828. North Carolina courts have recognized that
employees who provide consideration for the employment contract beyond merely performing the
work for which they were hired may not be discharged without cause. See Tuttle v. Kernersville
Lumber Co., 263 N.C. 216, 139 S.E.2d 249 (1964). Sides had moved from Michigan to accept the
job at DUMC, and the court found this action sufficient independent consideration to remove the
contract from the at-will rule. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 345, 328 S.E.2d at 828.
96. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 345, 328 S.E.2d at 828.
97. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978).
98. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551. The court stated: "[T]he employer's interest in running his
business as he sees fit must be balanced against the interest of the employee in maintaining his
employment, and the public's interest in maintaining a proper balance between the two." Id.; see
also Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (eighteen years of
service and grievance policy of employer operate as a form of estoppel to preclude discharge); For-
tune v. National Cash Register, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (breach of covenant of good
faith when salesman with forty years of service discharged to deprive him of commission on $5
million dollar sale).
101. See Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 920, 436 A.2d 1140, 1143 (1981);
Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 297, 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1980).
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strictive of an employer's discretion to manage the work force. 102 Moreover,
such a step would "subject each discharge to judicial incursions into the amor-
phous concept of bad faith."'103
Some commentators have recommended adopting a "just cause" require-
ment for discharging employees to provide greater protection to employees than
either the public policy exception or the covenant of good faith. 14 Lower-level
employees receive little benefit from the public policy exception,10 5 partly be-
cause they are less likely to file lawsuits and partly because the conduct giving
rise to the public policy exception is more likely to involve upper-level employ-
ees.10 6 Moreover, courts have drawn an essentially ad hoc distinction between
private and public rights, which has resulted in inconsistent opinions. 0 7
Despite these valid observations, a "just cause" standard for discharge does
not-have wide support.10 8 The New York City Bar Association Committee on
Labor and Employment Law (the Committee) has termed "just cause" protec-
tion "the maximalist model" because it represents an extreme modification of
the at-will rule.'0 9 The Committee feared that under such a standard any dis-
charge would be potentially actionable and would require judicial determination
of "cause." 110 In addition, a "just cause" standard would discourage employers
from discharging marginal employees and thus would compromise the em-
ployer's economic interests."'
Courts have been most willing to limit the at-will rule when the discharge
contravenes an established public policy, particularly a legislatively declared
policy.112 The Committee has termed the public policy exception "the minimal-
ist model," because it represents the least extreme modification of the at-will
rule.113 The public policy exception, because it is more clearly defined than
102. See Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 569, 335 N.W.2d at 838.
103. Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 377, 652 P.2d 625, 629 (1982).
104. See, eg., Peck, supra note 46, at 48-49; Summers, supra note 46, at 508, 521; Note, supra
note 46, at 1948 n.11. For example, most Canadian provinces require that, absent "just cause,"
notice must precede discharge. In Nova Scotia, employees who have been with the same employer
for ten years are protected against unjust discharge even with notice. In France, employees with two
years of service at firms with at least eleven employees cannot be discharged without "serious and
genuine cause;" an employee who is dismissed without "cause" is entitled to severance pay and
either six months' compensation or reinstatement, at the employer's option. Estreicher, Unjust Dis-
missalLaws Some Cautionary Notes, 33 AM. J. CoMp. L. 310, 312, 316 (1985).
105. Note, supra note 46, at 1937.
106. Id. at 1942-47. The public policy exception has been defined in a way that offers more
protection to upper-level than lower-level employees. For example, upper-level employees have
greater access to information and are more likely to be asked to falsify records or to give false
testimony at a hearing. In addition, upper-level employees have a greater opportunity to detect
dangerous products or illegal practices, and are more likely to question employer decisions. Id. at
1945-46.
107. Id. at 1949.
108. See eg., Committee on Labor and Employment Law, At-Will Employment and the Prob-
lem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 REc. A.B. Crry N.Y. 170 (1981); Comment, TheAt-Will Doctrine: A
Proposal to Modify the Texas Employment Relationship, 36 BAYLOR L. Rav. 667 (1984).
109. Committee on Labor and Employment Law, supra note 108, at 189-90.
110. Id. at 190.
111. Id. at 188.
112. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
113. Committee on Labor and Employment Law, supra note 108, at 191.
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good faith or "just cause," would minimize the "burden on the courts, the costs
to business efficiency and the interference with our national policy in favor of
private ordering and free collective bargaining." 114 Under the public policy ex-
ception, employers retain the discretion to discharge for any reason that does
not contravene public policy, while employees receive protection from the harsh-
ness of the at-will rule.
Contemporary economic conditions and employment practices demand
protection of employees' rights. Today, unlike the latter part of the nineteenth
century, most employees depend solely on private nonfarm employment for eco-
nomic security. 115 Employees generally lack the power to bargain for protection
against arbitrary discharge. 116 Those who are discharged may be unable to find
other employment because of economic conditions1 17 or the blemish of dismis-
sal.1 18 Further, it is inefficient to discharge employees for reasons unrelated to
performance, and such arbitrary dismissals may have a demoralizing effect on
the workforce.' 19
The public policy exception strikes a proper balance between protecting an
employee's right to job security and an employer's right to discharge unsuitable
employees. By adopting the exception, the Sides court put North Carolina in
accord with most other jurisdictions that have limited the at-will rule. The ex-
ception ensures that North Carolina employers will not be able to use the threat
of dismissal to coerce employees to commit violations of fundamental public
policy. Other states yet to recognize the public policy exception to the at-will
rule should follow North Carolina's example.120
SUSAN K. DATESMAN
114. Id. at 191-92.
115. One commentator has stated:
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for our means of
livelihood and most of our people have become completely dependent upon wages. If they
lose their jobs they lose every resource, except for relief supplied by the various forms of
social security. Such dependence of the mass of the people upon others for all of their
income is something new in the world.
F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951).
116. Note, Employment at Wilk A Proposal to Adopt the Public Policy Exception in Florida, 34
U. FLA. L. REv. 614, 621 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Employment at Will]. Decreased job
mobility has resulted from seniority policies, Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN.
L. REV. 335, 338 (1974), pension plans and related benefits, Glendon & Lev, Changes in the Bonding
of the Employment Relationship: An Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C.L. REv. 457, 475-79 (1970),
and increasingly specialized skills, Blades, supra note 46, at 1405.
117. Note, Employment at Will, supra note 116, at 621.
118. Blades, supra note 46, at 1406.
119. Committee on Labor and Employment Law, supra note 108, at 188.
120. North Carolina recently refused to limit the at-will rule, however, on the basis of an implied
contract arising from personnel policies. Griffin v. Housing Auth., 62 N.C. App. 556, 303 S.E.2d
200 (1983); see also Note, Continued Resistance to the Inclusion of Personnel Policies in Contracts of
Employment: Griffin v. Housing Authority of Durham, 62 N.C.L. REv. 1327 (1984) (discussing
personnel policy exception to the at-will rule).
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